A tale of two Italians: Comparing the tactics of Enzo Maresca and Roberto De Zerbi
Tactics expert and performance analyst Dominic Wells explores the similarities and differences in the tactical approaches employed by two innovative Italian managers - Brighton’s Roberto De Zerbi and our very own Enzo.
The “most influential manager of the last 20 years”. If I were to ask who that quote is referring to, only a few names would come to mind. For me, the leading candidate would be Pep Guardiola - the current IFFHS Men’s World Best Club Coach. But it’s actually the current Manchester City manager who is being quoted - and he’s referring to Roberto De Zerbi.
In fact, it’s De Zerbi’s ideas in both the build-up and the usage of third-man runs that have garnered that respect from Guardiola. With all that said, how does this relate to Leicester City? Well, at the helm, the Foxes have another Italian manager, Enzo Maresca, whose style of play could be likened to both De Zerbi and Guardiola.
As fans of Leicester City, most readers will have a good understanding of how Maresca wants his team to play. I will dissect this with more micro details later in the article, but I thought it could be fun to analyse the performances through the lens of “De Zerbi-ball”. So, what are the key components of his sides?
Shaping up
Structurally, De Zerbi likes his teams to function in back-four formations. Ordinarily, this will see Brighton & Hove Albion play in a 4-2-3-1 shape. In possession, De Zerbi has clear principles in how his team builds out from defence. The focus is to remain in position and wait for the ball, instead of moving towards it. Short, accelerated bursts to unmark and then become free to receive.
When receiving possession, the double pivot (of #6s in the 4-2-3-1) has to occupy an open-body stance. The reason for this is to maximise angles upon reception and allow the recipient to have an increased awareness of teammates’ availability to receive. De Zerbi also has a focus on an idea he’s coined to “end where the press starts”, which I will explore later.
The centre-backs should remain fairly close to each other, with De Zerbi stating a distance of 10 to 12 metres as a proxy. Of course, in a 4-2-3-1 that places the back-four in a more traditional two centre-back and full-back combination, which differs from Maresca’s in-possession 3-2-4-1, probably the biggest discrepancy of ideas in the named components.
Another area that sees the two managers differ is their usage of wingers, which is actually a by-product of the formations used. In a fully fit Seagulls XI, Kaoru Mitoma and Solly March are the wingers, and they will be asked to stretch the opposition's defensive line by positioning high and wide. While Stephy Mavididi does this on the left side for Leicester City, the role of the right-sided winger (often Abdul Fatawu) is more akin to a wing-back.
The reason for the high and wide wingers is to open spaces between the opposition lines, in unison with movements from their #9 -probably the most complex position and role in a De Zerbi XI. Tasked with reading the opposition structure, and always trying to maximise space for the other forwards, Brighton’s #9 has to make runs in behind, drop to receive to feet, pin the centre-back and also join the midfield line.
With all that said, you can get a basic understanding of the general rules Brighton’s team has to follow, through the management of De Zerbi. Hopefully, as you read that section you acknowledge a few similarities in playstyle. I will make those connections now, but there are definitely nuances in how both Italian managers create these in-game aspects.
The box build-up
Let’s start in the build-up. Brighton will look to create a “box” in the depth of the pitch, between the two centre-backs and the #6s. This is identical to what Maresca looks to create in the build-up, however, the surrounding shapes differ, as it can appear lop-sided for the Foxes depending on which two of the three centre-backs are used—or if Hermansen becomes the de facto central centre-back.
Brighton
Leicester
When you dissect these deeper-forming boxes, you can see that Brighton’s forms quite naturally in the 4-2-3-1, whereas Leicester’s involves the goalkeeper stepping out to become another defender, with the midfield composition being shuffled to have a #6 and #8 in the same line/depth. De Zerbi wants to simplify positioning, not wanting rotations. Instead, the way to create space is to quickly accelerate (vs. a standing marker) and open a gap between the recipient and the presser.
Whereas Leicester create spaces in depth by rotating positions and asking constant questions of the opposition. Do you track the runner and leave your natural positioning, or do you stay in your defensive shape and let the player run free? It’s that constant toing and froing that the Foxes utilise which differs from De Zerbi’s ideologies.
Baiting the press
If you read analytical literature on De Zerbi, quite a lot of tactical analysts suggest that he first popularised the idea of “baiting the press”. In interviews, he’s rejected this notion.
When watching the functionality of his defenders (and goalkeeper), I think baiting the press is a core concept for De Zerbi’s teams. It’s also central to Maresca’s methodology.
Both managers deploy goalkeepers competent with the ball at their feet, especially through the lens of modern goalkeepers. Both Hermansen and either Bart Verbruggen or Jason Steele display confidence when holding possession even under increased rates of pressure. The way they tempt the opposition into pressing is by placing a single foot on top of the ball, which opens a quick shift onto either side (and the consequential angles).
Brighton
The idea that baiting the press is centralised for both managers is further evidenced by De Zerbi’s development of “end where the press starts”. I’ve added some visuals below, but the general idea is that you recognise when the opposition starts to press, and the mini-objective for that possession is to end the sequence by making a pass into the player that became unmarked by the first piece of pressing movement.
Here’s a birds-eye view visual of Brighton executing this against Tottenham earlier in the season.
Heung-Min Son is the player who makes the first pressing movement, so Brighton’s right-sided centre-back acknowledges this by passing into the #6, who can then make a simple pass to the newly free right-back.
Leicester
I wasn’t sure if Leicester City would mimic this. I was aware that press baiting is a crucial part of Vestergaard’s (as the central centre-back) role, but I didn’t know if finding the newly-free player was a mini-objective. However, after watching some footage through this lens, Maresca definitely advocates this.
In the opening minutes of the Championship game against Huddersfield Town, Vestergaard (as the right-sided centre-back) goes into the #6, attracting pressure from the left-sided forward.
This opens space for the right-back, if the ball can reach the “where the press starts” parameter. A quick bounce pass combination ends with the right-back, James Justin, carrying through the space created in an identical fashion to De Zerbi’s Brighton.
Wingers
The largest difference in the two managers’ styles is through the optimisation of their wingers. Leicester’s starting wide-players often function asymmetrically, due to Ricardo Pereira inverting to play as a secondary #6 from the right-back position. The knock-on effect is that Abdul Fatawu plays the wide-right channel in isolation, unlike Stephy Mavididi, who will be supported by either Wout Faes or Callum Doyle (as de facto left-backs).
Naturally, having two players in a channel can push the more attacking option into an even higher position. That’s why Mavididi will almost exclusively position as a high and wide winger (replicating the structure of De Zerbi’s wide players), but Fatawu will fluctuate between functioning as the high/wide option and, at times, a more traditional wing-back.
In Kaoru Mitoma and Solly March, De Zerbi has players who want to stretch the opposition's defensive line. They can both sit in the high and wide positioning that forces the marking full-backs to respect. The goal of this winger usage is to create more space for the interior players to operate in. It’s also perfectly synced with the movements of the #9, to accentuate the pockets between the lines.
For Leicester, these spaces are equally as important. The way to maximise pocket space for the interior players - primarily the #8s - is to rotate positions centrally. A quirk that I noted against Ipswich Town was Harry Winks and Kiernan Dewsbury-Hall both rotating from their general positions - deep #6 and #8 - instead taking up de facto #8 and right-back locations. What this achieved was confusion for Ipswich’s defensive block and, in turn, gave Winks (now as the #8) space in the pocket to receive.
In general, the output of both De Zerbi and Maresca, in terms of control, tempo, and progression, bears a lot of similarities. It’s in the details - the rotation of positions and the usage of the forward players - that create the discrepancies in the two Italians’ approaches.
One thing is for sure. While De Zerbi’s exploits in the Premier League have rightly gathered a fandom, Enzo Maresca is another manager who appreciates the finer details and will have an illustrious career, wherever that may take him.
NOW READ: Leicester City’s healthy full-back problem
FURTHER READING: For more tactical analysis of Enzo Maresca’s Leicester, check out Dominic’s Medium site.
